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Abstract 
This essay examines the role of data and program-code archives in making economic 
research “replicable.” Replication of published results is recognized as an essential part 
of the scientific method.  Yet, historically, both the “demand for” and “supply of” 
replicable results in economics has been minimal. “Respect for the scientific method” is 
not sufficient to motivate either economists or editors of professional journals to ensure 
the replicability of published results. We enumerate the costs and benefits of mandatory 
data and code archives, and argue that the benefits far exceed the costs. Progress has been 
made since the gloomy assessment of Dewald, Thursby and Anderson some twenty years 
ago in the American Economic Review, but much remains to be done before empirical 
economics ceases to be a “dismal science” when judged by the replicability of its 
published results.  JEL Classification: B4, C8 
 
(This is Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis Research Division working paper 2005-14.)  
Revised version of paper prepared for the American Economic Association meeting, 
Philadelphia PA, January 9, 2005.  Views expressed herein are solely those of the authors 
and not necessarily those of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis or the Federal Reserve 
System, New York University, Drexel University, Fordham University, or their staffs. 
Correspondence:  (1) anderson@stls.frb.org; (2) wgreene@stern.nyu.edu; (3) 
bdmccullough@drexel.edu; (4) vinod@fordham.edu.
  11. The Supply of, and Demand for, Replication 
In theory, economic research is scientific research—that is, economic theory suggests 
empirically falsifiable hypotheses and investigators seek to confront those hypotheses 
with data.  Often, observers of science regard all researchers as if they are single-minded 
seekers of truth.  As a general result, this is unlikely to be true in other than the simplest 
representative-agent models.  But, as we discuss, the publication process embeds 
problems of strategic information transmission, knowledge hoarding, bounded rationality, 
and lying for strategic advantage (including claiming falsely that empirical results are 
robust and reproducible).  To our knowledge, these issues have not heretofore been 
addressed together. 
Many analysts have noted that actual researchers seek not only truth but also fame 
and fortune, that is, researchers seek individual rewards.  For most academic researchers, 
publication is essential to their livelihood.  Economic models with heterogeneous agents, 
applied to economists themselves, suggest that utility maximizing researchers will 
rationally choose outcomes other than those chosen by a social planner whose goal is to 
maximize scientific progress per dollar spent.  Further, information-theoretic models 
suggest that, unless the preferences of authors, editors and readers are fully aligned, 
authors perceive a strategic advantage to withholding some information.  Early 
commentators include Mayer (1980) and Kane (1984); formal models have been 
presented by Feigenbaum and Levy (1993, 1996) and Levy and Peart (2001).
1    These 
models suggest that researchers will exercise a level of care in their research that is less 
than that which would be chosen by an omnipotent social planner, and that researchers 
will be reluctant to share data and programs if such reluctance delays (or makes 
impossible) attempts to replicate their published results.
2  These professional practices of 
economists are not consistent with uniform (and optimal, from a social planners’ 
viewpoint) truth-seeking behavior.   
Ideally, investigators should be willing to share their data and programs so as to 
encourage other investigators to replicate and/or expand on their results.
3  Such behavior 
allows science to move forward in a Kuhn-style linear fashion, with each generation 
seeing further from the shoulders of the previous generation.
4  At a minimum, the results 
of an endeavor—if it is to be labeled “scientiﬁc”—should be replicable, i.e., another 
                                                 
1 Levy and Peart (2001) discuss the role of truth-seeking behavior in representative-agent models where 
every agent is a truth-seeker and in models with heterogeneous agents where individual rational choice 
suggests otherwise.  Two other interesting papers that use a principal agent framework are Hoffman and 
Just (2000) and Kilpatrick (1998).  In both papers, replication solves a principal agent problem in which 
researchers lack incentives sufficient to exercise the optimal level of care regarding false results, that is, the 
issue is to align individual agent’s incentives with the socially optimal outcome. In the models, false results 
are revealed only via replication; hence, the researcher’s incentive against replication. The social planner, 
however, requires that the researcher share all data. 
2 The numerous comments included in the same volume as Feigenbaum and Levy (1993) review most of 
the arguments regarding replication/verification of published studies. 
3 In this analysis, the term “replication” refers to reproducing an author(s)’ results using the same dataset 
and software.  Other authors have referred to the same concept as “verification” (Hyman, 1972) and  
“certification” (Leamer, 1993). 
4 Kuhn (1972) characterizes science as such a linear process.  Others have objected, noting occasional 
backsliding due to the bandwagon effects of false but seductive ideas that divert scientists on to false 
avenues of research.  
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applied economics using econometric software, this means that another researcher using 
the same data and the same computer software should achieve the same results.  Yet, it is 
well-known that the likelihood of replication by a reader, or subsequent researcher, 
without the original authors’ programs and data is near zero. 
How confident would you be of the published results in an empirical economics 
article if:  
o  No one had ever attempted to replicate the results? 
o  Replication had been attempted—and failed?  
o  The original authors could not reproduce their own results?  
One might think that the solution to the problem is simply to require that all empirical 
research be reproducible—but it is not quite so simple.  Consider some more answers to 
the above question:  
o  If the results had been replicated using the original software package?  
o  If the results had been replicated using the original software package, but a newer 
version of the same package produced different results?  
o  If the results had been replicated using the original software package, but a 
different software package produced different results?  
o  If two would-be replicators, both using the original software package, found that 
one could replicate and the other could not?  
 
So, what is the “replicability” policy of most current professional journals?  Most 
journals have no such policy.  A few journals have “replication policies” whereby authors 
“must” provide data and code upon request, and even fewer journals have mandatory 
data/code archives, where the researcher must deposit his data and code prior to 
publication.  There is no journal, however, that can provide tangible evidence that its 
published results are, generally speaking, replicable.  To date, every systematic attempt to 
investigate this question has concluded that replicable economic research is the exception 
and not the rule. 
The implicit replication standard of economics journals is to assume (or, perhaps, 
pretend?) that the quality of the research underlying its articles is of sufficiently high 
quality that another researcher could, if desired, replicate the articles’ results.  In fact, 
modern empirical economic research is too complex for such a simple assertion—and has 
been for a half-century or more.  Few journals would even attempt to publish a 
description of all an article’s data sources and every programming step.  But, without 
knowledge of these details, results frequently cannot be replicated or, at times, even fully 
  3understood.
 5  Recognizing this fact, it is apparent that much of the discussion on 
replication has been misguided because it treats the article itself as if it were the sole 
contribution to scholarship -- it is not.  We assert that Jon Claerbout's insight for 
computer science, slightly modified, also applies to the field of economics
6: 
An applied economics article is only the advertising for the data and code 
that produced the published results. 
Can such “advertising” be misleading?  And, if so, does there exist a mechanism for 
enforcing “truth in advertising”?  As we discuss further in the next section, publication in 
professional journals may be interpreted as a strategic information problem.  The 
published article’s results and conclusions are but an advertisement for the substantive 
research—how those results were obtained.  But, authors may perceive a strategic 
advantage to publishing the conclusions while withholding the underlying data and 
program code.  To the extent that the data and program code are useful for future 
research, some authors may wish to prevent authors from “catching up” in the research 
race.  If the research is valid, then hoarding this material—the core of the article’s 
contribution to knowledge—is harmful to the progress of science because it does not 
permit tests for replication, robustness, and refutation.  On the other hand, to the extent 
that the data and code would reveal the written research to be incorrect, this hoarding 
protects the dishonest or incompetent researcher. 
Examples abound.  When Breusch and Gray (2004) reanalyzed and replicated the 
work of Chapman, et al. (2001), they found “strikingly different results.”  As another 
example, the book by Giles and Tedds (2002) estimated the size of the Canadian 
underground economy to be 3.4% of GDP in 1976, rising to 15.6% in 1995.  The policy 
implications of such a result are staggering.  Yet, when this work was reanalyzed and 
replicated, it was found that “the overall level of their estimates is a result of numerical 
accidents” (Breusch, 2005). 
The experiences of economists who have sought to replicate published research 
suggest that Panglossian faith in economists’ commitment to the scientiﬁc method is 
                                                 
5 The global-warming debate provides an illustration outside economics.  In an important article, Mann, 
Bradley and Hughes (1998) presented evidence of temperature warming during the twentieth century, 
relative to the previous several centuries.  Their article became prominent when one of its charts (a hockey-
stick shaped scatter plot, with a “shaft” consisting of historical data and a “blade” consisting of upward-
sloping twentieth century data) was featured prominently in the 2001 report of the U.N. Intergovernmental 
Panel on Climate Change (the Kyoto treaty).  As expected, high visibility invites replication and tests of 
robustness.  In a series of papers, McIntyre and McKitrick (2003, 2005a, 2005b) have chronicled their 
difficulties in obtaining the data and program code; the publishing journal, Nature, did not archive the data 
and code.  After some delay, the authors provided the data (see Mann et al., 2004) but have declined, at 
least as of this writing, to furnish their statistical estimation programs despite their statement that the 
statistical method is the principal contribution of their article, specifically, to “…take a new statistical 
approach to reconstructing global patterns of annual temperature back to the beginning of the fifteenth 
century, based on calibration of multiproxy data networks by the dominant patterns of temperature 
variability in the instrumental record.” (Mann et al. 1998, p. 779).  McIntyre and McKitrick’s examination 
suggests that Mann et al.’s statistical procedure (a calibrated principal components estimator) lacks power 
and robustness; specifically, that the procedure induces hockey-stick shapes even when the true data 
generating process has none. 
6 Jon Claerbout, noted geophysicist and computer scientist, is The Cecil and Ida Green Professor at 
Stanford (see Buckheit and Donoho, 1995). 
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toward irreproducibility.  Numerous authors have explored this nexus.  Dewald et al. 
(1986) discussed the rational choices of journal editors who fear reducing the 
attractiveness of their journals to authors by requiring disclosure of data and programs.  
Diamond (1996) proposed a more general model of the behavior of economists as 
scientists.  Mirowski and Sklivas (1991) and Feigenbaum and Levy (1993) constructed 
formal models that suggest, in equilibrium, the number of replications is near zero.   
In these models of economists’ behavior, the incentives are straightforward.  
Researchers receive a stream of rewards for new knowledge that begins with publication 
and eventually tapers to near zero.  A replication that demonstrates the results to be false 
immediately ends the reward stream; if the replication further uncovers malicious or 
unprofessional behavior (e.g., fraud), negative rewards flow to the researcher.  So long as 
withholding data and program code does not reduce the post-publication stream of 
rewards (and disclosure of data and program code does not increase it), researchers will 
rationally choose not to disclose data and programs.
7  Such models largely explain the 
well-known proclivity of academic researchers in many disciplines to keep secret their 
data and programs (e.g., Fienberg et al., 1985; Bornstein, 2001; Boruch and Cordray, 
1985; Bailair, 2003). 
At least insofar as the accuracy of published results is concerned, applied economics 
is a “poor relation” to theoretical economics. Theoretical economic results, generally 
speaking, are sounder than empirical economic results. The reason for this is simple: the 
process by which the researcher obtained the result is transparent and amenable to 
veriﬁcation. Frequently referees check to make sure that theorems are correct and, if the 
referee has not vouchsafed every part of the article, the interested reader can do so. Not 
so with empirical economics, where the process of obtaining a result is far from 
transparent, and myriad details not described in the text can be found only in the code.  
Empirical economics, by actively discouraging replication, does not incorporate the self-
correcting mechanism of the scientific method -- there is no process whereby bad results 
can be removed from the cumulative body of knowledge.   
Previous studies by two of the present authors have found that, left to themselves, 
many economists (and econometricians) do not understand the difference between 
algebraic calculations and numerical calculations; Altman (2003) contains a number of 
excellent discussions of the issues.  Perhaps the most frequent (and egregious) example is 
calculating the coefficient vector of an ordinary least squares regression.  The algebraic 
formula, , is well-known to have poor numerical properties 
(McCullough and Vinod, 1999).  It is nonetheless commonplace for GAUSS and Matlab 
code written by economists to implement the algebraic formula rather than the QR 
decomposition.  But, without access to an author’s code, how can a reader know how the 
article’s results were obtained? 
()
1 ˆ '
− = bX XX ' y
                                                 
7 The model of Feigenbaum and Levy (1993), in which rewards to researchers are driven by citations, also 
suggests that the divergence between the search for truth and rational individual choice will be largest for  
younger researchers (such as those without academic tenure), who will be less inclined to search for errors 
than older researchers and less inclined to devote scarce time to documenting their work. 
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replicating or verifying published results is unnecessary.  These arguments follow two 
lines.  First, some have argued that most published scientific results are of no interest or 
importance and, hence, replication of such results should neither be eased nor 
encouraged.  The arguments of Collins (1993) are dated but remain of value because he 
makes his argument starkly and because similar views continue to be advanced: 
… no-one cares about the large majority of scientific results—whether 
they are right or wrong makes no difference to anyone. A reasonable 
guess, based on some old surveys, is that about 50 percent of scientific 
papers are not read by anyone except the author, referees, and editor, 
while studies of the citation indices suggest that about 90 percent of 
published papers are never cited.  (Collins, p. 233) 
To economists, Collins’ argument seems odd indeed.  Intelligent people operating in 
competitive markets seldom knowingly squander real resources, and significant resources 
were used to produce, review and publish such articles. Further, presumably 
knowledgeable editors and referees agreed the articles contained new knowledge.  And, 
as Collins later notes, it is impossible to know ex ante which published papers later will 
become prominent.  In his comment, Collins suggests that the experiments of Dewald et 
al. (1986) held little value because few, if any, of the JMCB articles examined mattered 
for the progress of economic science.  One can only imagine the ire of the authors, 
bristled by the mild request that they submit data and program code, now being told that 
their contributions mattered not at all to economics!  Further, Collins ignores the result in 
Dewald et al. (1986) that authors are far more likely to have at-hand an article’s data and 
programs at the time of publication than several years thereafter.  Archiving data and 
program code hedges all researchers against the uncertain future importance of published 
papers.   
The second line of argument, not orthogonal to that advanced by Collins and others, 
is that the competition of ideas eventually will bring to the forefront all “important” 
results; typical of this line of argument is Hamermesh (1997).  Such results, it is argued, 
will be verified, replicated, and repeated until a synthesis emerges, with or without 
archives of data and program code.  This argument is appealing because it not only 
absolves the researcher from his scientific responsibility to produce replicable results, it 
also suggests the possibility that even though no individual study is replicable, “on 
balance” the intellectual marketplace will get the “average” outcome correct.  This is 
unlikely due to sample-selection publication bias.  More sophisticated analyses, such as 
Bornstein (1991) and Feigenbaum and Levy (1996), recognize that researchers have 
significant control over the set of results submitted for publication.  A sample-selection 
bias arises because results that are perceived as “significant” generate a larger stream of 
rewards to the researcher than do others.  This bias does not vanish even in repeated trials 
by multiple researchers.  The median of a set of biased individual estimates is not an 
unbiased estimate of the true median, and the meta-estimate of the median will coincide 
with the true median on a set of measure zero.  Replication from the authors’ data and 
program code promises not only verification of the original results, but also an 
opportunity to explore the result’s robustness. Replication/verification/extension that 
  6begins without the authors’ original data and program code has no power to examine 
publication sample-selection biases.
8
Yet, the importance of the sample-selection publication bias has been a matter of 
dispute. Some papers have proposed a “meta-data” approach to science, essentially an 
analysis-of-variance or response-surface analysis of how experimental results vary with 
observable design factors such as the chosen data set or the method of estimation; see 
Hunter and Schmidt (1996), Stanley (2001), or Hert et al. (2004).  These studies ignore 
the publication-bias problem, however.  Further, even if this meta-analysis epistemology 
eventually functions as intended, it may be horribly inefficient:  It does not address the 
issue of research path-dependence, that is, of researchers being diverted down blind 
alleys by incorrect results, nor the highly unequal prominence of professional journals.  
How many results, published in lesser journals, does it takes to outweigh the results 
published in a single American Economic Review article?  These issues, and others, can 
be rendered moot simply by requiring that authors make public their extant data and 
program code. 
 
2. The Theory of Strategic Information Transmission and “CheapTalk” 
Creating original research manuscripts for professional journals is craft work.  Although 
often referred to as “knowledge workers,” researchers might equally well be regarded as 
artisans, with creative tasks that include collecting data, writing code for statistical 
analysis or model simulation, and authoring the final manuscript.
9  Similar to other 
craftsmen, researchers’ output contains intellectual property—not only the final 
manuscript, but also the data and programs developed during its creation. Yet, for the 
academic-type researchers with which we are concerned in this analysis, publishing in 
peer-reviewed journals is necessary to maintain professional viability (and, for those 
without academic tenure, employment).  A strategic situation naturally arises in which the 
researcher feels compelled to reveal a sufficient amount of his material to elicit 
publication, while simultaneously seeking to retain for himself as much of the intellectual 
property as possible. There are few available models of such a process in the literature.  
 
In this analysis, we interpret the publication process—consisting of submission, 
refereeing, and an editorial decision—as a problem of strategic information transmission, 
in the classic sense of Crawford and Sobel (1982).  The process also may have aspects of 
bargaining, to the extent that an author receives a “revise and re-submit” request from an 
editor.
10  Further, the process may have aspects of a repeated game to the extent that the 
author during his career may submit multiple different manuscripts to the same editor.  If 
                                                 
8 There also is George Stigler’s well-known dictum regarding product differentiation in intellectual 
research: both results that are too similar to, and too different from, previously published results will be 
difficult to publish.  Hence, as a matter of rational choice among scientists, an accepted but incorrect result, 
unless proven false by replication, can persist in the literature for a significant period of time.  
9 Indeed, “polishing” the final manuscript is well-except vernacular. 
10 Crawford and Sobel (1982) note that their primary motivation stems from the theory of bargaining.  The 
extensive subsequent citations to their article (approximately 300 in the Social Science Citation Index since 
publication, and 120 in the last five years) support the model’s broad applicability to situations where 
partially “hiding your hand” (not revealing all information) influences a decision by others, such as our 
context here. 
  7the repeated submissions resemble a long-memory process, then the backward-looking 
learning that arises from repeated contacts can lead to convergence of the preferences of 
agents (Blume and Arnold, 2004).   
 
The Crawford–Sobel model contains two agents whose preferences differ by a 
measurable distance.  One agent sends information to the other, who will make a 
decision.  The outcome of the decision enters both utility functions. The better-informed 
agent is designated the sender, S, and the decision maker is designated the receiver, R.  
The sender has private information that is of value to both agents, but the sender wishes 
to share only enough valuable information to induce the desired decision by R.  The 
preference function of R is defined before information is received from S, that is, R’s 
preferences are independent of the information sent by S.
11  We interpret the better 
informed agent as the author of a specific manuscript.  We interpret the receiver as the 
editor of a journal, who has preferences regarding the type of material desired for the 
journal and the minimum quality of article that will be published in the journal.  We do 
not specify the process that forms the receiver’s (editor’s) “preferences,” but his choices 
likely are constrained by either an editorial board or the association that owns the journal 
(if any).  The sender’s private information includes knowledge of the “quality” of the 
article’s results, including the quality of the author’s computer programs, the robustness 
of the results to minor variations in the data, and the degree of care exercised by the 
sender during the course of the research.  
 
Crawford and Sobel construct a continuous measure of the degree of strategic 
interaction between the sender and received by allowing the sender, S, to partition his 
private information into subsets, that is, the sender partitions the support of the 
probability distribution of the variable that represents private information.  His decision 
variable is which partition(s) to send to the decision maker, R.  In the model, the “best” 
decision is made when S sends all the available information to R.  How does this 
paradigm map into the interaction between an author and a journal’s editor and referees?  
For a careful author with a robust result, sending more information (data and programs), 
when requested, cannot reduce the likelihood of publication.  For a less careful author, 
sending more information increases the likelihood that the result will be discovered as 
fragile, incorrect, or fraudulent, whether before or after publication.  (We discuss below 
that the flow of benefits to an author from a published article cease almost immediately 
when the results are discovered to be false.)  Similarly, as we discuss in detail elsewhere 
in this analysis, the sender’s incentive to re-check results for accuracy—multiple times, if 
necessary—depends on the likelihood of an error being uncovered and the professional 
penalty that is incurred for publishing flawed work.  The sender’s incentive is to 
withhold, conditional on obtaining publication, as much information as possible. 
 
In the Crawford-Sobel model, the strategic withholding of information by the 
sender vanishes when the sender and receiver have the same preferences.  For academic 
publishing, the convergence of preferences likely is an increasing function of the 
prominence of the authors. Even outside the realm of professional journals, it is well-
recognized that many of the more prominent academic economists place their data and 
programs freely on their own web pages.  Further, it is well-recognized that sharing such 
                                                 
11 In the game theory literature, this often is referred to as “cheap talk” because the information sent by S is 
transmitted costly and does not impose any cost on R except for entering into his decision process.  
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limit, many of these authors become editors (or associate editors) of prominent 
journals—and their preferences perhaps converge, in the Crawford-Sobel sense.  
Recently, as we discuss elsewhere in this analysis, a number of journals have established 
data and/or program code archives.  As we document below, considered as a function of 
time, the rate of establishment of program and data archives has been uneven with few 
until very recently.  Why the uneven pattern?  To proceed our later discussion, we note 
that the Crawford-Sobel analysis suggests an answer.  The surge in the establishment of 
archives during the last few years, ten years after the release of the first Mosaic web 
browser and the widespread opening of the World Wide Web to researchers, perhaps 
reflects a shrinkage of the distance between the preferences of sender and receives, of 
authors and editors who both have found more open information sharing beneficial.
12
 
The importance of the convergence of preferences for reducing strategic 
information withholding has been reinforced by recent empirical studies in the 
knowledge management literature. Wasko and Faraj (2005) examine knowledge sharing 
within a legal professional association.  Members contributed information to the 
association’s web site which was freely shared.  Benefits to the members were primarily 
reputational, including being perceived as more clever and capable than others.  Better 
known members tended to contribute more knowledge, ceteris paribus, as did members 
with more interactions with other members.  Parallels could be drawn to prominent 
economists who act as editors of major journals but freely share their data and programs.  
Kankanhalli et al. (2005) repot a similar study of large-scale public sector organizations, 
interpreting the results via social capital theory.  Their conclusions are similar to Wasko 
and Faraj.  Finally, Lin et al. (2005) examine how knowledge users identify “experts,” 
that is, how professionals who share information become known in an informal 
community as experts.  In their sender-receiver model (an extension of Crawford-Sobel), 
information asymmetry induces “experts” (including, say, leading researchers) to 
withhold private information from the market, thereby increasing the barriers for others 
to assess the quality of available information (such as the results in published articles) 
and slowing the production of new knowledge.  Their model suggests no solution to this 
problem beyond that of Crawford and Sobel: more closely align preferences between 
senders and receivers to reduce the strategic advantage of withholding of private 
information.  
 
In summary:  The publication process for professional journals in economics is a 
strategic information problem.  Current practice in economics is to define “publication” 
as the event of a manuscript/article appearing in print.  Best scientific practice, however, 
would suggest re-defining “publication” to include the underlying data and programs.  
Yet, to the extent that the programs and data are valuable for future research, economic 
theory suggests that authors will seek a strategic advantage by withholding such 
information, if possible.  Such strategic information models do not have unique 
equilibria, and hence comparative statics exercises are subtle.  Yet, the models suggest 
that the withholding of private information for strategic advantage is a decreasing 
function of the distance between the sender’s and receiver’s preferences; solving the 
withholding problem requires aligning the preferences of the sender and receiver.   
                                                 
12 In part, this idea echo’s Kuhn’s theory of scientific revolution in which the rate of adoption of new ideas 
is an increasing function of the rate of retirement of older researchers.  
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3.  The Past and Present 
Two separate issues arise in replication of published articles:  (1) obtaining the article’s 
data and programs, and (2) using the data and programs to reproduce the article’s results.  
Professional journals have most commonly addressed the first by adopting a “publication 
policy” that requires authors, as a condition of publication, to provide to readers, on 
request, the article’s nonconfidential data and/or programs.  Does such a policy work?   
As an experiment to “stress-test” such policies at three journals—the American 
Economic Review (AER), the International Journal of Industrial Organization (IJIO), 
and the Journal of International Economics (JIE)—McCullough and Vinod (2003b) 
requested data and programs from the authors of the articles in the [then] most-recent 
issue.  Despite the authors’ pre-publication commitment to provide such materials, only 
one-third did so.  The results are shown in Table 1.  
 
Table 1: Do Authors Honor Replication Policies? 
 
 
      
     Journal 
 
 
Number of authors asked 
to supply data and code 
 
Number of authors that 
supplied 
data and code 
    
        IJIO  3  1 
        JIE  4  1 
       AER  8  4 
Total 15  6 
 
Note: The figures indicate only if the author(s) supplied data and code, not whether 
the supplied data and code actually reproduced the published results.     
      Source:  McCullough  and  Vinod  (2003b) 
 
The second issue—replicating published results from authors’ materials—has been 
examined in several studies.  Dewald et al. (1986) examined 54 data sets for articles 
submitted to and/or published by the Journal of Money, Credit and Banking (JMCB) 
during 1982-1984.  Adopting a mandatory data/code archive is no more a guarantee of 
replicable research than is a voluntary “replication policy.”  They judged that only 8 were 
sufficiently complete and well-documented so as to permit a straightforward replication 
attempt.  In two studies, McCullough et al. (2005a, 2005b) examined the later archives 
from the JMCB and Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis Review, respectively.
13  The 
archived materials reproduced the published results in only 5 to 7 percent of the sampled 
articles. These studies are summarized in Table 2.   
 
Table 2: Do Archives Work? 
 
                                                 
13 At the time of McCullough (2005a)’s study, all of the JMCB archives examined by Dewald et al. had 
been discarded by the JMCB.  Hence, theirs is a set of newer articles with no overlap to the previous study. 
















software to run 
code 
       
na  Dewald et al. (1986)  na  54  2 
McCullough et al (2005a)  193  69  14  7 
McCullough et al (2005b)  236  78  9  19 
Total 429  201  25  26 
 
Similar conclusions have been found in other social sciences; for political science, see 
King (1995, 2003) and Ray and Valeriano (2003); for psychology, see for example the 
papers in Neuliep (2001); for discussion of the physical sciences, see for example 
Fienberg et al. (1985) and Bailer (2003).  
The difficulties are further well-illustrated by the experience of the American 
Economic Review.  At the time of publication of Dewald et al., the AER adopted a “repli-
cation policy” that required authors to retain an article’s data and share non-confidential 
data with readers on request (Ashenfelter, et al, 1986).  This policy was substantively 
weaker than the mandatory data/code archive recommended by Dewald et al.  
Subsequently, many other journals followed the lead of the AER, including The Economic 
Record, Journal of International Economics, Journal of Human Resources, International 
Journal of Industrial Organization and Empirical Economics.  Non-compliance with 
such a policy was predictable—the policy offered little or no reward to authors for 
compliance, while continuing to expose them to the risk that a flaw might be uncovered 
in their work (Mirowski and Sklivas, 1991).  The policy was tested, and found wanting, 
seventeen years later in McCullough and Vinod (2003a).  In response, the AER 
implemented a mandatory data and program code archive (Bernanke, 2004).
14  This 
brings to eight the number of journals with data and/or code archives: American 
Economic Review, Econometrica, Review of Economic Studies, Macroeconomic 
Dynamics, the Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, the Federal Reserve Bank of St. 
Louis Review , the Economic Journal, the Journal of Applied Econometrics, and the 
Journal of Business and Economic Statistics.  The first five require both data and code, 
while the last three require only data; the first three joined the club in the last year – 
significant momentum for the club. 
Some authors have praised replication as an important aspect of economic research, 
even when replication efforts have produced corrections to published results.  In 
acknowledging a programming error in a previous article, Feldstein (1982), p. 630, wrote: 
“They [Leimer and Lesnoy] set an admirable example of the tradition of 
replication on which all scientific work ultimately rests.  As economic 
research increasingly involves large and complex computer programs to 
                                                 
14 A cynic might point out that the AER’s 1986 replication policy statement appeared on the first page of its 
issue of the journal (just before the Dewald et al. article), while the 2004 announcement appears on the last 
page of its issue, following the notes and comments section. But perhaps the ultimate efficacy of the 
announcement is inversely proportional to the publicity the editor gives it; we hope so. 
  11analyze microeconomics datasets or simulate models that cannot be solved 
analytically, replication studies like that of Leimer and Lesnoy should 
become increasingly important.” 
The reluctance of academic researchers to share data and programs has been widely 
discussed for more than twenty years, even when their research has been supported with 
public funds from, say, the National Science Foundation.
15  The historical record 
suggests that neither AER-style data-sharing “policies,” nor laissez faire data archives, are 
adequate for replication (e.g., McCullough et al., 2005a, who analyzed the archive of the 
Journal of Money, Credit and Banking).   A journal’s archive policy must include 
guidelines for authors:  programs should include comments for replicators; the names of 
datasets should match the names used in programs, all data transformations should be 
described, etc.  Such rules follow from the experiments with the archives of the JMCB 
and Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis Review discussed in McCullough et al. (2005a, 
2005b), who found replication often thwarted by authors’ disorganized materials.  In 
response to McCullough et al. (2005a), the JMCB is revising its archive rules. In response 
to McCullough et al. (2005b), we expect that the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis will 
revise its rules, too.
16  
In its first issue, the editor of Econometrica (1933), Ragnar Frisch, noted 
the importance of publishing data such that readers could fully explore 
empirical results.  Publication of data, however, was discontinued early in 
the journal’s history.  In a 1966 issue of the journal, Zellner and Thornber 
(1966) showed that the same code run on different computers could 
produce different answers.  The journal's editorial board did nothing – did 
not even require authors to reveal the computer on which they had run 
their code.  The journal arrived full-circle in late 2004 when Econometrica 
adopted one of the more stringent policies on availability of data and 
programs.
17
 Yet  while  Econometrica went full-circle in one direction, Journal of 
Political Economy did so in the other direction.  In the pages of the JPE, Feige 
                                                 
15 On this subject, the excellent papers in Fienberg et al. (1985), are as relevant today as when they were 
written.  Cecil and Griffen (1985) discuss legal issues regarding data sharing for publicly funded projects. 
Their analysis suggests that, contrary to popular opinion, data and programs produced by publicly funded 
projects are not automatically in the public domain as a result of public funding. 
16 The archive of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis Review began in the fall of 1992 when the new 
research director, William Dewald, required that the results in each Review article be replicated in-house by 
a research analyst prior to publication. Initially, files were distributed on floppy disks and via the Research 
Division’s dial-in computer bulletin board service.  Beginning in 1995, the files were made available on the 
Division’s Internet web pages via links placed next to each published article, and on the public archive for 
published articles maintained by the ICPSR at the University of Michigan.  So far as we are aware, no other 
Federal Reserve Bank research publication has a public data/program archive.  During 2004, the Federal 
Reserve Bank of St. Louis Review became the second, and only currently published, Federal Reserve Bank 
publication to be indexed in the Social Science Citation Index (the first was the Federal Reserve Bank of 
Boston’s New England Economic Review, which ceased publication in 2004).  Because inclusion in the 
Citation Index is based, in part, on the frequency with which a journal is cited in other journals, inclusion of 
the Review lends support to the arguments of Tauchen (1993) and Gleditsch et al. (2003) that articles 
published in journals with data and program code archives are more valuable to researchers, and hence 
more likely to be cited, than articles without. 
17 <http://www.econometricsociety.org/submissions.asp#4>, as of January 13, 2005. 
  12argued for, as a minimum standard, “full reporting of procedures and data” by 
journals (Feige, 1975); this minimum standard would effectively require 
providing sufficient information to permit replication.  In response, the editors of 
the JPE did not require full reporting of procedures and data, but instead instituted 
a “Confirmations and contradictions” section, whose purpose was to foster the use 
of alternative statistical tests of hypotheses.  They noted, “Confirmations will 
require new data; contradictions will be most powerful when based on the same 
data” (JPE Editors, 1975).  Replication might seem a natural by-product of such 
work; can one really understand the method by which the original results were 
produced without first replicating them?  Mirowski and Sklivas (1991) analyzed 
the thirty six notes appearing in this section from 1976 through 1987.  Only five 
involved actual replications, but one of which was successful.  This twenty 
percent success rate at the JPE is better than what Dewald, et al. found at the 
JMCB, but it hardly inspires faith in the replicability of results published in the 
JPE.  Updating these numbers, between 1988 and 1999, the section published 13 
notes, only one of which contained a replication.  Apparently JPE has allowed the 
section to die an ignominious death befitting the section’s true relation to 
replication: it has been inactive since 1999.  JPE has gone back into the fold with 
those journals that do not even bother to pay lip service to the idea that published 
results should be replicable. 
Prospects for attaining the goal of publishing replicable research are bright for those 
journals and their editors, such as Econometrica, that care about replicability.  Eight of 
the oldest and most prestigious economics journals are published by not-for-profit 
organizations and professional societies—the AER, Econometrica, Review of Economics 
and Statistics, Quarterly Journal of Economics, Journal of Political Economy, The 
Economic Journal, Journal of Business and Economics Statistics, and the International 
Economic Review.  Currently, four of these owners (the AER, Econometrica, JBES, and 
EJ) have attached a data archive to their journal.  The others should do so also. 
4. The Beneﬁts  
A number of benefits will arise from widespread availability of data and program 
archives.  Many of these benefits can appear only if journal archives include data and 
program code.  Experience and evidence confirm that data-only archives are not adequate 
to enable replication of most published results (e.g., Racine, 2001; McCullough et. al., 
2005a, 2005b).  Data-only archives should be broadened to include both data and 
program code. 
The costs of data and program code archives are so low that even modest benefits 
produce a large benefit/cost ratio.  In the past, some editors argued that journals would 
incur a significant financial cost to operate an archive.  The Inter-University Consortium 
for Political and Social Research (ICPRSR) estimated that during the mid-1980s, for 
example, it cost $25 to prepare and send a dataset.  Today, in the “Internet age,” the costs 
of operating a data and program archive are very low.
18   The cost to authors of 
                                                 
18 The JMCB data archive constructed by Dewald et al. at Ohio State University between 1982 and 1984 
consisted primarily of reels of mainframe (IBM) style computer tape and decks of punched cards.  
Occasionally, a lucky (and well-funded) researcher owned an IBM PC—especially after release of the IBM 
  13producing materials for archives also is small.  In previous studies, authors have stated 
that their cost of creating and contributing materials was minimal when they knew in 
advance that submitting such materials was required.
19  Further, the willingness and 
ability of authors to supply materials is higher when the research is fresh than when it has 
aged a year or two between completion and publication (e.g., McCullough and Vinod, 
2003a).  Today, the primary “cost” to a journal of a data and program archive is the 
increased caution focused by the archive on its authors, who wish to avoid errors leading 
to embarrassment.
20    
Errors do occur in empirical research, replication is the way to uncover them, and 
professional journal archives are an efficient way to disseminate corrections. The results 
in large-scale replication studies such as Dewald et al. (1986) and McCullough (2005a, 
2005b), suggest that the frequency of inadvertent errors in published articles is not low.  
Further, some errors can be costly.  Suppose, for example, that McCrary (2002) had not 
found the programming error reversing Levitt’s (1997) result in the American Economic 
Review that increases in police substantially reduce crime.  If a policymaker had acted on 
Levitt’s finding and shifted funds from, say, low-income housing to police, social welfare 
would have been reduced.  Some errors, and their corrections/corrigendums, also can be 
difficult to locate.  Consider the case of Hansen and Seo’s (2002) article in the Journal of 
Econometrics.  The numerical values shown in the article’s Table 4 are all incorrect (that 
is, each of the 72 reported p-values is incorrect), and over half of them suggest incorrect 
statistical inferences at the 5% level (in 40 of the 72 cases, the correct result and the 
published result are on different sides of 0.05).  How do we know this?  Hansen 
published the correct results and code on his personal website—but not in the journal nor 
on the journal’s web site.  All researchers occasionally make mistakes; Hansen is to be 
lauded for placing scientific integrity above the appearance of infallibility.  But such 
corrections leave unanswered the responsibility of the journal that published the article.  
Corrections to published articles that are never disseminated, obviously, benefit few 
researchers.  From a scientific perspective, erroneous results should be “purged” from the 
cumulative body of knowledge.  To do so, what better method exists than via the 
data/program code archive of the journal that published the original research? 
No one should ask journal editors and referees to ensure that articles are replicable—
the cost in time and materials would be prohibitive.  Rather, the issue is aligning 
principal-agent incentives such that authors themselves furnish materials that readily 
permit replication.  Journals can do so by including pages that cite successful or 
                                                                                                                                                 
XT in 1982 and, later, the IBM PC AT in 1984—and shared data on 5-1/4 inch floppy disks.  (Later, 
toward the end of the project, we placed most data files on floppy disks.)  Such an archive had two 
drawbacks.  First, it was costly (and tedious) to duplicate data on cards and mainframe magnetic tape.  
Second, as noted by Dewald et al., the archive lacked immediacy.  A JMCB subscriber, while reading an 
article, could not simply click on a web link to view the data and programs but rather had to endure a delay 
of at least several days as data were duplicated and mailed. Dewald (1993) notes that the costs of the 
archive to the JMCB were minimal while he was editor. 
19 Dewald et al (1986); Anderson and Dewald (1994). 
20 The only journal of which we are aware that has an active replication section is the Journal of Applied 
Econometrics which, curiously, has a “data only” archive.  Preferably, an archive also should include the 
output from the program.  A difficulty for some researchers is that some Windows-style menu-driven 
software, such as EViews, does not produce a batch program that can be run to reproduce results.  Indeed, 
many users of menu-driven software are at a loss to write programs. 
  14unsuccessful replications.  In response to McCullough et al. (2005a), the Journal of 
Money, Credit and Banking instituted just such a section.  Major corrections might 
deserve several published pages but not every discrepancy between a replication and a 
published article is so important.  A replication section might furnish no more than a 
URL to a web page containing the replicator’s work; such a web page might be operated 
by the journal, by the replicator, or perhaps be an “e-journal” devoted solely to 
replication.  We anticipate that a large number of archives will generate a larger number 
of replications and, in turn, demand for an e-journal composed mostly of replication 
results. 
In addition to merely being good science, the use of data/code archives to produce 
veriﬁed/veriﬁable results will bring other benefits.  Reinforcing a speculation in Dewald 
et al. (1986), Gleditsch et al. (2003) found that articles that provide data are cited twice as 
often as articles that do not provide data—and citations are valuable (Diamond, 1986).  
One can reasonably expect that the cite rate will be even higher for articles that have data 
and code.
21  
Broadly, data and program code archives will lead to more and better economic re-
search, for several reasons. 
o  Research will be done more carefully.  Little is likely to focus a researcher’s  
attention on detail more than the knowledge that other researchers—graduate 
students, professors, and the like—will be able to initiate their research project by 
examining the accuracy of your project.  
o  Research will (finally) be more self-correcting. Even though there will be fewer 
errors because researchers will be more careful, archives do not ensure that 
researchers are perfect. Archives do ensure that there is a reasonable chance that 
errors will be uncovered – as opposed to the status quo, wherein there is an almost 
zero probability that errors are uncovered.  
o  Research will progress more rapidly. It will no longer be necessary to reinvent the 
wheel just to extend or check the robustness of another researcher’s results.  New 
studies will better be able to extend previous studies, moving economics closer to 
Kuhn’s image of linear progress. 
o  Archives will provide a rich source of examples to try new estimation and 
inference methods.  
Additional, less-noted benefits will accrue through better software, for a number of  
reasons. 
o  It will be easier for developers to incorporate and standardize new developments. 
At times, an author’s algorithm may be less than transparent in a published article. 
Subsequent implementations can lead to different software packages giving 
different numbers. McCullough and Renfro (1999) discuss such problems with 
                                                 
21 As discussed in Anderson and Dewald (1994) and further below, subsequent to Dewald et al. a large 
group of journal editors seemed to disagree when offered the opportunity to require their authors to submit 
data to an NSF-sponsored archive. 
  15Bollerslev’s GARCH.  Fiorentini, Calzolari and Panattoni (1996) proposed a 
benchmark for the problem, across packages; afterwards, software results became 
much less disparate (Brooks et al, 2001). Yet, problems remain. McCullough and 
Vinod (2003b) demonstrated that six packages gave six different answers to the 
“ﬁnd the 1% VaR” exercise considered by Engle (2001) in his primer on 
GARCH. 
o  More people solving the same problem with different packages can improve 
existing routines in software packages by increasing the interaction between users 
and developers, which is a fundamental component of how software changes over 
time (Greene, 2004).  This can include uncovering bugs and comparing differing 
algorithms used to implement the same estimators.  Developers cannot ﬁx 
problems in software packages if their existence is not known.  Zeileis and 
Kleiber (2004), for example, ported Bai and Perron’s (2003) structural change 
code from GAUSS to R and were unable to replicate successfully. Their 
experiments uncovered a weakness in one of GAUSS’s distribution functions, 
which Aptech Systems (developer of GAUSS) quickly ﬁxed.  In another example, 
Bruno and DeBonis (2004) compared several packages’ approaches to panel data 
estimation. Investigating disparate output, they found that all the packages used 
different, but theoretically valid, estimators. A simulation exercise found that the 
estimators were not of equal accuracy.  In a third example, Stokes (2004) used six 
packages to solve a problem for which it is known that a numerical solution does 
not exist, and found that ﬁve of the packages claimed to have found a solution.    
o  More benchmarks will be produced.  Producing a benchmark can be 
accomplished two different ways. One way is via very careful coding, with every 
step well-documented, as in the case of the Calzolari and Panattoni (1988) FIML 
Benchmark. Another way is when two independently coded programs produce the 
same answer. A recent example is Drukker and Gua (2003), who show that a 
panel data method in the package Stata produces the same result as an 
independently programmed result published in Journal of Applied Econometrics.  
o  Users will better be able to determine the effect of new software releases.  Data 
and program code archives provide a ready-made test bed for developers, and 
their customers, to check for version incompatibilities and, in some cases, to 
revisit past research. 
Software packages already incorporate the easy-to-program procedures.  New methods in 
the journals tend to be more difficult to program.  Data and program archives provide 
developers a clearer view of algorithms, accelerating the pace at which software can 
incorporate new estimators.
5. The Future  
The economic theory that we outlined in Section Two suggests that authors might 
perceive strategic advantages in not furnishing data and programs to journals so long as 
the preferences of authors, editors and readers are not fully aligned.  We have suggested 
that a mechanism for aligning these preferences is mandatory data and program code 
archives.  However, to do this will require leadership on the part of journal editors.  
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Bank of St. Louis Review have, for years, stood alone.  In just the past year, the number 
of journals with mandatory data/code archives has doubled: American Economic Review 
led the way, followed in short order by Econometrica and Review of Economic Studies.  
Who will be next to stand for replicability of published results?  Or will these six stand 
alone for several more years, as the majority of economic journals remain uncommitted 
to publishing replicable research? 
 
As a profession and a science, where should economics seek to be in, say, five years?  
How does the profession, via collective action, move from a low-replicability equilibrium 
to a high-replicability one?  In our view, professional journals must accept that leadership 
challenge.  As a form of collective action, journals can assure that published research is 
sufficiently documented—including data and program archives—and that published 
articles’ results are replicable.  Absent such a journal structure, both economic models of 
rational choice—and the evidence—suggests that most authors will not voluntarily 
choose to incur the costs of creating archival files and documentation.   
Archives of data and program code are the key.  Outlets have existed in which to 
publish replication studies for more than twenty years—the Quarterly Journal of 
Business and Economics began encouraging submission of replication studies in 1984; 
see Mittelstaedt and Zorn (1984) and Kane (1984).  Yet, the supply of replication studies 
depends on journals archiving authors’ data and program code.  Further, the results of 
replications, no matter where published, are difficult for subsequent researchers to locate 
unless they are noted on, or linked to, the journal’s archive web page. 
In the past, many journal editors seemed uninterested in taking steps toward ensuring 
that the results they published were replicable. Some editors, indeed, expressed the fear 
that requiring authors to submit data and programs would reduce the attractiveness of 
their journal, relative to others that did not have such a requirement.  Any such negative 
impact is reduced to the extent that the availability of data and programs increases the 
value of a journal to its readers. Yet, as noted in Anderson and Dewald (1994) and 
discussed further below, even when the National Science Foundation offered journals a 
free archive, their editors refused to require that authors submit data and programs.  Of 
course, adopting a “replication policy” also was free and, since in practice authors were 
not bound to honor the policy, it imposed an even lower cost on authors.  Yet, most 
professional journals did not even choose to implement a non-binding policy—and the 
same is true today.  Is this science?  
Specific actions include: 
1.  Journals should implement mandatory data/code archives, and implement rules 
(e.g., those enumerated by McCullough (2005b)) to ensure that the archives 
function properly. 
2.  Journals should include replication “announcement” sections.  Such sections 
provide professional credit to researchers who undertake replications.  Further, we 
suggest that all professional journals, on their web sites, establish a location for 
attaching to published articles a “successfully replicated” comment including a 
summary and supporting material.  In some cases, replication efforts that explore 
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Quarterly Journal of Business and Economics pioneered this in 1984, and more 
recently has been joined by the Indian Journal of Economics and Business, the 
latter with a broader editorial policy that does not require extension of the original 
article but encompasses reporting the results of a straightforward replication 
attempt.  The IJEB also has made the replication articles available to all, 
subscribers or not, on their web site, and has placed supporting materials on the 
journal's web site. 
3.  Some journals must be willing to publish the results of failed replications when 
the primary journal will not.  This “threat of entry” removes the incentive for any 
individual editor to seek to increase his journal’s attractiveness (to authors, not 
readers) by making it known that he does not publish replication results.  Current 
examples of journals willing to publish such replications include the Journal of 
Economic and Social Measurement and the Indian Journal of Economics and 
Business.  Ideally, the replication sections would be available on the Internet to 
subscribers and non-subscribers alike. 
Economic theory suggests, as discussed above, that the profession’s current low-
replicability equilibrium may be interpreted as a principle agent problem.  If so, 
leadership by journals via data/program archives likely can lead the profession to a high-
replicability equilibrium.  At that point, the role of archives and replication as a check on 
error or fraud likely will diminish, while the frequency of replication as a starting point 
for new research will increase.
22  If so, we recommend that the economics profession—
perhaps with leadership from the American Economic Association—create a single “one-
stop-shop” archive for data and programs across journals.
23  In fact, such an archive 
already exists although it is lightly used.  In 1995, the Inter-University Consortium for 
Political and Social Research (ICPSR)—on its own, without NSF financial support—
established an open-access archive for the data and programs of any published article.
24  
As of December 2004, approximately 250 articles were included.  Two-thirds of the 
articles were economics-related.  Omitting articles related to Michigan’s Panel Study of 
Income Dynamics, all the economics articles were from the Federal Reserve Bank of St. 
Louis Review.  
In the case where the cooperation necessary to build a single archive is impossible, 
we recommend that each journal’s archive use XML tags to identify its material.  This 
simple practice will allow all archives to be linked via a VDC/DDI environment, and be 
                                                 
22 Feigenbaum and Levy (1993) predict this dynamic shift in the scientific role of replication.  Once 
replication/verification becomes commonplace, the quality of articles will endogenously improve such that 
most articles are easily replicated.  Yet, the number of replications need not decrease even if the number of 
replications done as a check on error or fraud decreases because the frequency of replication as a starting 
point for new studies should increase. 
23 Such an AEA-sponsored archive seems a reasonable extension of the proposals of Goffe (2004). Vinod 
(2001) suggests that such an archive—say,  the AEA-sponsored “Resources for Economists” at 
http://netec.wustl.edu/WebEc—could begin building a body of knowledge in empirical economics by 
collecting stylized “important empirical facts” on which authors and replicators agree.  
24 Membership is required to access most ICPSR archives.  The journal archive is open to all, no 
membership required. 
  18visible to Internet web spiders and search engines so that a search in Google or Yahoo 
locates the material.
25   
None of this will occur unless the editors of professional journals take the lead. Ten 
years ago, Anderson and Dewald (1994) re-visited the issue of replication in economics 
as a follow-up to Dewald et al. (1986) and found that little had changed.  The subsequent 
ten years have shown progress, however—five economics journals now have archives for 
data and programs, and three more have data-only archives.  Prospects for the future of 
replicable economic research are bright, primarily due to the fact that the number of 
journals with data plus program code archives has doubled in the past year, after having 
remained stagnant for many years.  This list must expand in the coming years; much 
remains to be done.  For empirical economics to at last become a science, the profession 
must embrace the scientific method by archiving and sharing data and program code.
                                                 
25 On the Virtual Data Center and Data Description Initiative projects, see Altman et al. (2001) and Blank 
and Rasmussen (2004). 
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